The Solicitors' Journal

and Weekly Reporter.

(ESTABLISHED IN 1857.)

LONDON, SEPTEMBER 13, 1919.

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION, WHICH MUST BE PAID IN ADVANCE: £2 12s.; by Post, £2 14s.; Foreign, £2 16s.

HALF-YEARLY AND QUARTERLY SUBSCRIPTIONS IN PROPORTION.

*** The Editor cannot undertake to return rejected contributions, and copies should be kept of all articles sent by writers who are not on the regular staff of the JOURNAL.

All letters intended for publication must be authenticated by the name of the writer.

GENERAL HEADINGS.

Cases Reported this Week.

Current Topics.

Lord Wrenbury as Publicist.

LORD WRENBURY is becoming a rather frequent writer of letters to the *Times* on affairs of public moment. On Monday there appeared a long and interesting letter of his—it occupied more than one column—on the question of Production and Prices, a letter marked by all the law-lord's well-known incisiveness and lucidity. Its merits are outside our province, and we express no opinion upon them. But it is interesting to note that Lord WRENBURY, of all our law-lords, is the one who has blossomed out into something of a publicist since his promotion to the House of Lords. Probably none of his colleagues had shewn less outward interest in political affairs before attaining that high rank. Lord WRENBURY, we believe, never stood for Parliament. His political colour is unknown. He was essentially a lawyer; a Chancery practitioner who never travelled outside the sphere of jurisprudence. As a Chancery Judge and as a Lord Justice of Appeal, he preserved—and rightly, for the political judge is a nuisance—the stern and even puritanical detachment of the mind wrapped-up in judicial business. But a law-lord occupies a position of "greater freedom and less responsibility." He is not restrained by etiquette from voting or speaking on public affairs in the House of Lords; in fact, Lord CAIRNS, when merely a law-lord, led the Conservative Opposition in that House before he became Chancellor. Lord WRENBURY has used his freedom during the war to shew that he holds decided views on affairs of State, and can express them with the same brilliance his reported judgments shew.

Lyndhurst in the House of Lords.

OF LATE YEARS our occupants of the Woolsack have tended to be vigorous partizans in politics, who have interests in statesmanship wider than those of the mere successful party lawyer. Lord CAIRNS, we believe, first revived this old tendency. Since the days of BROUGHAM and LYNDHURST, in the decorous and rather stately Mid-Victorian age, it had fallen rather into oblivion. A theory, never expressed but widely held, had arisen that the Lord Chancellor of the day should rather avoid any decided manifestation of partizanship from the Woolsack. In the days of PALMERSTON, RUSSELL,

and GLADSTONE, Chancellors were chosen rather for weighty legal attainments and high intellectual distinction than for their gifts as political leaders. They tended to cultivate the judicial mind. Presiding over the House of Lords, and occasionally sitting in the lower courts, they laid emphasis on their essentially judicial character. The accident that DISRAELI'S vice-leader in the House of Commons, Sir HUGH CAIRNS, had gone to the Lords with a peerage, and become a power there, altered all this. Lord Chancellors once more became great party gladiators, as when LYNDHURST and BROUGHAM had occupied the Woolsack. Lord LYNDHURST, indeed, delighted the House of Lords till he was nearly ninety with his eloquent and witty speeches. He deserved, if anyone ever did, the title of the "Old Man Eloquent." We sometimes are inclined to think that a judgeship, especially a law lordship, is the nearest equivalent to a "Cardinal" which our modern life affords in the famous story of TALLEYRAND. Asked in old age what *rôle* in life were best, he replied, "Until forty, a beautiful woman; from forty to sixty, a successful general; after that, a Cardinal." If we substitute for the "Cardinal" a "Lord Chancellor," we are not sure that the *mot* is far wrong. In these latter days, when ladies may become generals and judges, it is possible that someone of the fair sex will some day enjoy all three advantages, each at its special period of life.

Brougham in the House of Lords.

LYNDHURST WAS essentially a partizan lawyer, and so was Earl CAIRNS. So in a later age have been Lords LOREBURN, HALDANE and HALSBURY. But a great contemporary of LYNDHURST, HENRY BROUGHAM, might fairly be called a publicist rather than a partisan. BROUGHAM was all his days a reformer and a critic. He was nominally a Whig, but in reality he was interested rather in great matters of intellectual, social and legal reform than in mere party politics. Beginning life as a Scots advocate, he quarrelled so violently with the Scottish Bench that he felt it wiser to transfer to the English Bar. There he became the great political advocate who defended all accused of treason, sedition and public libels—a *rôle* filled by ERSKINE in an earlier age. He became also a daring demagogue and a powerful leader of the democratic party. But once on the Woolsack, his leaning towards the intellectual side of reform came at once to the surface. He was so unsatisfactory a party man, so independent and intractable, that in 1834 Lord GREY dissolved his ministry in order to rid himself of BROUGHAM—whom he regarded as SINDBAD regarded the Old Man of the Sea. Thereafter BROUGHAM became famous partly as an independent critic in the Lords, partly as an author of innumerable treatises and pamphlets in public questions, and partly as a promoter of "Christian Knowledge" and "Working Men's" Institutes. Everybody knows how, when he was a member of Committee of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, he insisted on writing the treatise on "Mechanics" himself; it was so full of blunders that the committee had to withdraw it from circulation. BAGEHOT tells a story of him which is characteristic, if it betrays the hand of *bon trovato* rather than the strict historian. BROUGHAM, it seems, had to change trains at Coventry on a journey. He had two hours to wait. At once, with characteristic energy, he hired the public hall for a lecture on "The Antiquities of Coventry," sent the bell-ringer round to announce that in one hour's time Lord BROUGHAM would deliver the lecture, went to the public reading-room to get up his subject (of which he knew nothing), and duly delivered the lecture! He finished just in time to catch his train. Such zeal and ardour men had in those days, when the Nineteenth Century was in its infancy!

Ex-Service Men as Lawyers.

WE ARE interested to hear from the Ministry of Labour that large numbers of ex-officers are taking advantage of its training scheme to become barristers and solicitors. We wish them all success, but we are not sure that they are wise in choosing two over-crowded professions, where hereditary influence and an early start count for so much in achieving, not merely success, but even the barest chance of a livelihood. However this may be, we are sure that all in the profession will gladly do what they can to help. Barristers can allow ex-officers to read in chambers without the usual fee of 100 guineas, and can afterwards offer them preferential chances of "devilling"—that precarious path towards a practice. Solicitors can accept them as articled pupils. One of the most important features of the measures for resettling ex-service men in civil life is the Government scheme whereby ex-officers and other ranks of good education may be assisted to take up or resume training for business and professional careers. In the phase of the work dealt with by the Appointments Department of the Ministry of Labour, training is arranged for in offices and works, &c., and the co-operation of employers is therefore essential to success. Many employers have responded to the appeal which has been made to them with the greatest willingness, and although the scheme has only been working fully for a comparatively short time, over 3,500 students are now in training.

Openings in Solicitors' Offices.

IT IS not much use an officer getting a training in the office of a solicitor unless he has a chance of getting a good appointment in that office afterwards, preferably a partnership or a managing clerk. Solicitors who agree to take ex-officers should consider first whether they can hold out hopes of either the above. If they cannot, it would be well to tell the applicant so quite frankly, leaving it to him to decide whether or not he cares to take the risk. The legal profession has attracted a very large number of candidates, and up to the 22nd August no fewer than 398 training vacancies had been filled in the offices of solicitors. The number of applicants is, however, very greatly in excess of the number of training vacancies available, and employers who can help by offering to train suitable candidates are urgently requested to communicate with the nearest district office of the Appointments Department. It should be added, that in cases where it is proved necessary, grants are made to students to assist in payment of their fees and maintenance during the period of training.

Embargoes and the *Ejusdem Generis* Rule.

THE LARGER question which Lord PARMOOR and Sir JOHN SIMON proposed to raise has gone by the board as the result of the Government's action in abolishing the prohibition of imports as from 1st September. But prohibitions are still retained, apparently under section 43 of the Customs Act, 1876, on a list of goods in the case of which "dumping" is feared, and which are "key industries"—*i.e.*, dyes, chemicals, glass, &c. The question arises whether this can legally be done under that statute. Of course, the proper mode of doing it is by a Finance Act, or rather a Customs Act. But possibly section 43, which permits the prohibition of "Arms, ammunition, explosives and other goods," is wide enough. That is the issue, and a reasonable difference of opinion is possible. The *ejusdem generis* rule is always a difficult one to construe or apply in any novel set of circumstances.

The Rule of *Contemporanea Expositio*.

IN THE present case a further rule of interpretation may have to be considered. In the case of ancient statutes it is well to look at the surrounding circumstances, to see the conditions under which the statute whose construction is in dispute was passed. Contemporary documents which throw light on these circumstances are admitted in evidence, due to the well-known principle of *contemporanea expositio*. In determining the applicability of the *ejusdem generis* principle, it is legitimate to consider the circumstances surrounding Parliament when the section was enacted. The Government was apprehensive of armed revolt in Ireland, and it is this

apprehension, rightly or wrongly entertained, which affords the master-key to the interpretation of the words "other goods." The goods aimed at were goods that could be used to destroy human life during a civil tumult. There had also been serious Labour troubles in London, culminating in the gas-stokers' strike and leading to the Conspiracy and Law of Property Protection Act, 1875. Thus Ireland and Labour are the two keys which reveal the intention of the Legislature. The section would cover a destructive invention, lyddite, *e.g.*, although discovered after the Act, and perhaps non-destructive goods capable of being used to further insurrection. But it is difficult to see how it could be extended to cover ordinary harmless articles of commerce. Still, the maintenance of "key industries" is a mode of national defence, and goods ancillary thereto are in rather a different position to articles of ordinary commerce. So far as the prohibition of articles which tend to destroy industries vital to defence of the realm is concerned we think the position of the Government is a good deal stronger than Lord PARMOOR or Sir JOHN SIMON seem willing to admit.

Licences to Import Prohibited Articles.

BUT THE question of embargoes must not be confounded with a totally different problem—namely, the question whether the granting of licences to import or export is a violation of the Statute of Monopolies. That raises a question of very great difficulty, on which we would not care to be dogmatic. The decision by the courts should be one of our leading cases in constitutional law. Lord PARMOOR has put his case in the following terms:—

> "I do not think that it was suggested on behalf of the Government, in the House of Lords debate, that the Customs Consolidation Act, 1876, could be construed in such a way as to justify a system of selective protection, through the agency of discriminating licences. The Lord Chancellor refrained from giving any view on the legality of prohibition, as applied to the articles included in the list, although it was stated that the Law Officers of the Crown had given a favourable opinion. The value of such an opinion cannot be gauged unless it is published *in extenso*. There is, however, a fundamental distinction between prohibition and a system of discriminatory licences. It was against this latter system that the main attack in the House of Lords was directed, and to which the main criticism was applied. Apart from any question of policy, the illegality of this system would be the same, whether it is intended to maintain the old list or the shorter list, of which a copy has been published in your columns. The principle of *droit administratif* is making fatal progress, and thus undermining the legal safeguards of our civil liberties, which have been built up by centuries of effort."

There we must leave this interesting question.

Omnibuses in Public Streets.

AN old-standing problem of very great difficulty came before a Divisional Court on a case stated by the Walsall justices in *Thomson* v. *Birmingham Motor Omnibus Co.* (62 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL 683). As the judges differed on the point, the result is not very satisfactory; but no further appeal is possible in a criminal cause or matter, and the decision is therefore binding on all criminal courts, magisterial or *nisi prius*. The dissenting judge was Mr. Justice DARLING, the majority consisting of Justices AVORY and ATKIN, both judges whose opinions deservedly carry great weight. In order that the point of this important decision may be appreciated, we will summarize briefly the legal provisions affecting its subject-matter.

It is hardly necessary to say that in urban areas outside London the user of the public streets by profit-earning vehicles is regulated by the Town Police Clauses Acts, 1847 and 1889, which are to be construed together as one statute. In London the corresponding enactments are the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act, 1869, and the London Cab and Stage Carriage Act, 1907. These statutes require the proprietor (and also the driver) of every "hackney carriage" which "plies for hire in any street," to obtain a licence from the local authority. Now there are obviously three very important classes of questions which may arise under a provision of this kind, first, whether or not the vehicle is a "hackney carriage"; second, whether or not it "plied for hire"; and third, whether the venue of the alleged offence was a "street." There are other cognate questions which may arise —*e.g.*, "standing" for hire is also an offence—but we may neglect these for the moment as irrelevant to the main issue. Before the proprietor of a vehicle can be convicted under the statutes in the case of an unlicensed vehicle, each and all of the three points just noted must be proved against him. The material words of the statute are these: "If the proprietor . . . of any carriage . . . permits the same to be used as a hackney carriage plying for hire . . . without having obtained a licence for such carriage . . . or if any person be found driving, standing, or plying for hire with any carriage" he is liable to a penalty not exceeding forty shillings (Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, s. 45).

Now the three problems just mentioned are all mixed up together, but the one with which we are primarily concerned in this article is the first, whether or no the unlicensed vehicle is a "hackney carriage." It is connected with the second and third problems in a way which will presently become apparent. What, then, is a "hackney carriage"? We must go to two separate statutes for a definition. The principal Act, the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, s. 38, defines it as follows: "Every wheeled carriage . . . used in standing or plying for hire in any street . . . shall be deemed to be a hackney carriage within the meaning of this Act." It will be seen then that a "hackney carriage" is not here defined in itself, but only with reference to the use to which it is put. In other words, there is no such thing as a "hackney carriage," statically considered; one has to consider what men of science call its "dynamic aspect," namely, the functions it performs, before one can ascertain whether or not any particular kind of wheeled carriage is a "hackney carriage" which requires a statutory licence. As a matter of fact, it was held in *Yorkshire Electric Tramways Co.* v. *Ellis* (1905, 69 J. P. 67), that a carriage worked by electrical energy, and constructed and used to run over a light railway made under the Light Railways Act, 1896, is not a "hackney carriage" which requires a licence. This is sound common sense, but if section 45 be strictly interpreted, it is not easy to exclude on any logical ground of construction light railways of this kind.

So far we have not got very far; we have seen that a "hackney carriage" is a "wheeled carriage" used for certain purposes. Now we must look at our second statute, the Town Police Clauses Act, 1889, which is incorporated with the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, and the Public Health Act, 1875. Here section 4 provides that the terms "hackney carriage," "hackney coach," "carriages," and "carriage," when used in sections 37, 40 to 52, 54, 58, and 60 to 70 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, are to be deemed to include an "omnibus." So our definition is extended to include "omnibuses" as "hackney carriages." Now note here that an omnibus is, in practice, always a "wheeled carriage," so that if section 4 merely intended to provide (as regards the particular point we are now considering) that an "omnibus" which plies for hire in any street is to be deemed a "hackney carriage," it was quite superfluous; such an "omnibus" is clearly a "wheeled carriage" plying for hire in a street, and therefore was already a "hackney carriage" within the meaning of sections 38 and 45 of the principal Act. Of course, this is quite a possible interpretation of the definition clause. As regards this point, it may be regarded as merely declaratory of the pre-existing law, or as inserted *abundanti cautela*, or as having other purposes to serve under the statute. Nevertheless, it is generally a sound rule of interpretation that words in a statute should not be regarded as superfluous for any purpose so long as there is a clearly intelligible meaning which can be given to them and which renders them of real significance.

How then can we attach a really significant meaning to the extended definition of "hackney carriage" given in

section 4 of the Act of 1889? In this way: we can hold that an "omnibus" is to be deemed a "hackney carriage," whether or not it satisfies the two conditions laid down in section 38 of the earlier Act, namely, that it "plies for hire," and does so "in any street." Perhaps an omnibus may be a "hackney carriage" even if it does not "ply for hire in any street," and may, in every case where it is used at all, require a licence. To see whether this view is right or not, we must next look at section 3 of the Act of 1889. This provides, "The term 'omnibus' where used in this Act shall include every omnibus, char-a-banc, wagonette, brake, stage coach, and other carriage plying or standing for hire by *or used to carry passengers at separate fares to or from or in every part of the prescribed distance;* but shall not include . . . any carriage starting from, and previously hired for the particular passengers thereby carried, any livery stable yard whereat horses are stabled and carriages let for hire . . ." Look at the words we have italicised. Those words offer two alternative functions on the part of an omnibus, either of which may render it a "hackney carriage" which requires the statutory licence. It is a hackney carriage if it plies for hire, or if it carries passengers at separate fares a prescribed distance, but not when it is merely hired out at its livery stable to particular passengers. In other words, omnibuses which carry the public at large are "hackney carriages," whether or not they stop to take up passengers in the public streets; but "private" omnibuses or "private" cars let to individuals are not.

Now, *primâ facie*, there is a great deal to be said for each of these possible constructions. And the question, which of them is right, was the one that came up in the case on which we are commenting. Here an unlicensed omnibus carried passengers on a regular line route at prescribed fares, between Birmingham and Walsall, but only allowed them to enter at the garage, and neither "plied for hire" nor "stood for hire" in any street. If "plying for hire" is an essential before an omnibus became a "hackney carriage" and requires a licence under the Act of 1847, then no offence had been committed. If, on the other hand, "plying for hire" is not essential in the case of omnibuses—although essential in the case of other wheeled carriages—then an offence had been committed. And the majority of the Court took the latter view. We can only leave the matter there, with the expression of our own opinion, that there is not much to choose between the two possible interpretations of the statute. It is a pity that Acts of Parliament which create penal offences of a kind which are not *mala in se* but merely *mala quia prohibita* should not state in clear terms the mischief at which they aim. As it is, an involved and intricate series of amending statutes not infrequently lead to unintentional breaches of the law—as finally decided by the courts—on the part of good citizens who are extremely anxious to comply with the law, but have come honestly to a different interpretation of some obscure words in a statute to that finally taken by the courts.

Mr. Lloyd George is to give personal attention to reports which are to be prepared by to-morrow dealing with the reduction of staffs in Whitehall. These, of course, will be quite provisional, and will be subject to revision later, when the individual reports of each department come before the Cabinet Finance Committee. Ever since the Prime Minister sent his peremptory letter to the heads of departments he has been kept fully informed of all developments, and reports have been sent to Deauville almost daily for his attention. This week's statements will be concerned only with three, or possibly four, of the great departments, and will indicate what actual economies are being or are proposed to be effected, how it is intended to reduce staffs, and what economies can be made in the estimates in respect of the departments dealing with the fighting forces, including the Ministry of Munitions. Already there has been a reduction of staffs in some of the departments, but this process will not be facilitated until reports have been prepared shewing exactly how they will be affected by dismissals and what the actual retrenchment will be in money. The returns which the Treasury have asked for, following the Premier's letter, are due next Tuesday, and it is intended, in cases where adequate data are not supplied, to return the reports and apply for more comprehensive information.

Judicial Statistics in War-Time.

Sir John Macdonell's very interesting memorandum to the Home Secretary on the civil Judicial Statistics for the year 1917 has just been issued as a blue book. It is unfortunate that these very valuable and interesting statistics should not see the light until eighteen months after the expiry of the period to which they relate: by that time the moral to be drawn from them comes too late for useful action. But under war-time conditions, no doubt, the delay is inevitable. The same delay occurred in respect of the reports for 1914, 1915, and 1916. War-time conditions, too, have compelled economies in the number and size of the tables. But, notwithstanding all this, to the lawyer who is seriously interested in the practical and sociological aspects of legal reform, the utility and interest of these statistics are simply enormous.

Nowadays statistics are always recast by progressive compilers in a diagrammatic as well as in arithmetical form. Curves of mysterious import and wavy outline are superadded to long tables of sombre figures, relieved by what Lord Randolph Churchill, when Chancellor of the Exchequer, is said to have described as "those dammed dots"—namely, the symbols for decimals. The reason for this tendency to be diagrammatic is no doubt the greater quickness with which the mind can grasp what the eye sees in one view, and the greater persuasiveness of the diagram. This is markedly illustrated in judicial proceedings before a Parliamentary Committee or a special jury, whose experts have to discuss the effect of figures. The expert, who can put his arguments in the shape of telling and simple diagrams and curves nearly always convinces the court. It is so much easier to grant his argument. Moreover, the argument is expressed more picturesquely and artistically, if not more logically. Just as a lucid and brilliant speech is more convincing than a dull but equally logical and scholarly oration, so a diagram is better advocacy than a table. Sir John Macdonell has recognized this, and has expressed his more interesting results in the form of three diagrams appended to the thirty tables of which his memorandum consists.

The tables compare everywhere the figures of 1917 and 1916 (war-time years) with those of 1912-16, of which a general average is taken. This is a little unfortunate, as the period covered by the average is one-half pre-war and one-half war-time. The following is a summary of the number of causes in those respective periods:—

—	1917.	1916.	Annual Average, 1912-1916.
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council	165	140	131·6
House of Lords	83	75	80·6
Supreme Court:—			
Court of Appeal	521	513	628·0
High Court of Justice:—			
Chancery Division	5,464	6,459	6,153·2
King's Bench Division ...	37,903	43,936	57,681·6
Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division	2,729	2,525	2,179·8
County Courts	609,526	798,017	1,090,751·2
Other Courts	10,345	14,639	21,904·4
Total	666,736	866,304	1,179,530·4

The figures for 1917 were fewer than those for the preceding year by 199,568—nearly 200,000—or 23 per cent. As compared with the average for the five years 1912 to 1916 the reduction in the figures was 512,846, or 43 per cent. The falling-off was almost wholly in county court proceedings, the figure for which dominates the total. But the figures for other courts also shewed reductions, the exceptions being appellate proceedings and matrimonial suits. The annual fluctuations of the business of the courts during the past twenty years are shewn in the diagrams appended to the tables.

County court proceedings were fewer than in any year since the establishment of the courts.

The remarkable increase in divorce petitions appears from diagram 2. There has been a rapid increase since 1910. This increase is mainly in petitons by husbands for dissolution of marriage. Such petitions by wives have actually fallen since 1914. There has been a slight increase in the number of actions tried, as appears from this table:—

Trials of Actions (and Matrimonial Suits) in the High Court of Justice in 1917 and in previous years.

—	1917.	1916.	Annual Average, 1912-1916.
Actions for Trial:—			
Pending at commencement of year	1,721	1,301	1,322·6
Set down during the year ...	4,553	4,733	5,105·0
TOTAL	6,274	6,034	6,427·6
Actions disposed of:—			
In Court	3,342	3,013	3,421·8
Otherwise	1,206	1,299	1,603·0
TOTAL	4,548	4,312	5,024·8
Pending at end of year	1,726	1,722	1,402·8

The moral of these figures is, of course, obvious. The effect of the Courts Emergency Powers Acts have been to limit the bringing of small debt proceedings in war time, and so have lowered immensely the work of the county courts. The absence of husbands on military service, the unrest and excitement of war conditions, and the instability of the feminine character under conditions of emancipation have led to a great increase of infidelity on the part of women. This has shewn itself in the increased number of husbands' petitions. But the same tendency towards increase of divorce actions has shewn itself ever since 1910. No doubt the Poor Persons Act has largely helped to bring about the general increases. It has assisted spouses to get the relief which formerly was an unattainable luxury.

As a matter of fact, since the period covered by the present statistics, there has been an even greater increase in divorce suits, 1919 as opposed to 1918, shewing an increase in all divisions, except Admiralty, but the gigantic increase of 85 per cent. in the divorce court. Here is the table:—

Proceedings commenced in London and Middlesex during first three months in 1918 and 1919.

Division.	January to March, 1918.	January to March, 1919.	
	Number.	Number.	Increase or decrease per cent.
Chancery	1,136	1,167	+ 3
King's Bench	5,043	5,950	+18
Probate	38	49	+29
Divorce	595	1,101	+85
Admiralty	270	180	−33
TOTAL	7,082	8,447	+19

The quantity of litigation which takes place under the "Poor Persons" procedure is increasing by leaps and bounds. This seems to shew how gravely defective was our law in providing the benefits of judicial remedial procedure for the proletariat until recent reformers took the matter in hand. It is not probable that barristers or solicitors have lost much work in consequence of the new assistance now given, as very few of the suitors could formerly have scraped together court fees or a lawyer's costs. The new rule by which solicitors get their out-of-pocket expenses and three-eighths of their normal scale costs where the court awards costs to the plaintiff in an "*in forma pauperis*" case should further prevent the profession from suffering.

Here is the Poor Persons table for 1918, as well as the earlier years:—

Court to which applications under the poor persons rules related (London only).

Year.	Court of Appeal.	Divisional Court, Kings's Bench.	Chancery.	King's Bench.	Probate, Divorce and Admiralty.	Total.
1914 ...	26	26	429	564	1,488	2,533
1915 ...	27	20	179	337	824	1,387
1916 ...	10	24	106	236	1,156	1,532
1917 ...	10	29	131	207	2,656	3,033
1918 ...	5	24	112	169	4,119	4,429
TOTAL	78	123	957	1,513	10,243	12,914

CASES OF THE WEEK.

Court of Criminal Appeal.

REX *v.* WILLIAM SHADFORTH. REX *v.* JOHN WILSON.

28th August.

CRIMINAL LAW—PRESCRIBING REMEDY FOR VENEREAL DISEASE—SPECIFIC ADVERTISED BY CHEMIST—SALE BY ASSISTANT—OFFENCE—VENEREAL DISEASES ACT, 1917 (7 & 8 GEO. 5, c. 21), ss. 1, 2.

By the Venereal Diseases Act, 1917, it is provided in section 1 (1): In any area in which this section is in operation, a person shall not, unless he is a duly qualified medical practitioner, for reward direct or indirect, treat any person for venereal disease or prescribe any remedy therefor or give any advice in connection with the treatment thereof, whether the advice is given to the person to be treated or to any other person. By section 2 (1): A person shall not by any advertisement or any public notice or announcement treat or offer to treat any person for venereal disease, or prescribe or offer to prescribe any remedy therefor or offer to give or give any advice in connection with the treatment thereof. By section 2 (2): On and after 1st November, 1917, the advertising or recommending any preparation for the prevention, cure or relief of any venereal disease is forbidden, and by section 3 is punishable on conviction by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £100 or imprisonment not exceeding six months.

S., a chemist in an area to which the Act applied, had for some years advertised prior to 1917 a specific for ailments due to an impure state of the blood, which was in fact intended to be one sold by him as being a specific in cases of syphilis and the like diseases. A police officer called at the chemist's shop, and having purchased a bottle of the medicine advertised, asked W., the assistant who served him, if the medicine was a good remedy for syphilis. W. replied in the affirmative.

Held, that the advertising of the remedy and the statement made were offences within the statute, and that both S. and W. were rightly convicted. In each case the conviction was therefore affirmed, but the sentence reduced.

These were two appeals by William Shadforth and John Wilson against sentences for offences under the Venereal Diseases Act, 1917, passed on the appellants at the London Sessions. The appellants were charged on a series of counts, among which were charges that they had been guilty of advertising a certain remedy contrary to sections 1 (1) and 2 of the Act, in that by so doing the defendant Shadforth had prescribed a remedy for a venereal disease and given advice, and also a charge of conspiracy to set at naught the provisions of the Act. The advertisements appeared in certain of the London newspapers and in a pamphlet called "Health News." They dealt with neurasthenia, debility, tuberculosis and syphilis, which were all attributable to impure blood. The prosecution arose out of a visit by a police officer to Shadforth's premises. Shadforth was a duly qualified chemist, and these advertisements had appeared for many years, and no objection had previously been taken against them. There was no suggestion that the remedy was not an admirable one or that it was a quack remedy more likely to do harm than good. The police officer, after making a purchase of the article advertised, said to Wilson, who was Shadforth's assistant in the shop: "Is it (the article purchased) any good for syphilis?" to which he received an affirmative answer. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that this evidence fell short of proving the offence of giving advice. The Act, it was argued, was intended to protect the public against quacks—to prevent unqualified persons treating people suffering from venereal disease. Here a man entered a chemist's shop to buy a

drug, and was told it cured syphilis. This was giving information, but it was neither advertising or prescribing within the meaning of the Act. The Statute did not make the sale of a patent medicine for a venereal disease illegal.. It was the first prosecution under the Act, and the sentence was excessive. On behalf of the Crown, the question whether the sentences should be reduced was left entirely with the Court. It was recognized throughout the proceedings that Wilson was merely the servant of Shadforth, and acted under his instructions. Shadforth had set the Act at defiance, and had all along acted as though he imagined that he was not contravening the Act, but the jury found that he was.

Lord READING, C.J., in giving the judgment of the Court (BRAY and SALTER, JJ., with him), said that in this case the first appellant appealed (1) against the conviction on law, (2) for leave to appeal against sentence, (3) leave to adduce further evidence, (4) against the refusal of Avory, J., to grant him bail. At the London Sessions he was sentenced to four months in the second division, and ordered to pay the costs of the prosecution. The second appellant, who was sentenced to six weeks in the second division, also asked for leave to appeal (1) against his conviction on law, (2) against his sentence, and (3) against the refusal of the judge to grant bail. It was said by counsel in support of the appeals that both the principal appellant and the Crown desired the decision of the Court upon the construction of the sections above set out in the Act of 1917. That the first appellant was a chemist of long standing against whom the prosecution had nothing to say, and that neither side for a moment thought that if the offence was proved it would be followed by imprisonment. He (the Lord Chief Justice) was not going into the details of the case. The Court had come to the conclusion that there was evidence of recommendation which amounted to advice, and therefore the convictions must stand. But as the prisoners had already been in custody for three weeks the sentences would be reduced to a period which would mean their immediate discharge. The first appellant (Shadforth) would, however, have to pay a fine of £100. —COUNSEL, for the appellants, *Patrick Hastings*, K.C., and *Walter Frampton*; for the Crown, *Travers Humphreys*. SOLICITORS, *Neve, Beck & Kirby*; *Wontner & Sons*.

[Reported by ERSKINE REID, Barrister-at-Law.]

CASES OF LAST SITTINGS.

Judicial Committee of Privy Council.

"THE LEONORA." 23rd, 24th, 27th, 28th, and 31st Jan. and 31st July.

PRIZE LAW—REPRISALS—BELLIGERENT RIGHTS AT SEA—SEIZURE OF NEUTRAL SHIP AND CARGO—CARGO OF "ENEMY ORIGIN"—ORDER IN COUNCIL OF 16TH FEBRUARY, 1917—VALIDITY.

The Reprisal Order in Council of 16th February, 1917, which authorizes the capture and condemnation of vessels carrying cargoes to or from countries contiguous to Germany, if such vessels have not first called at a British or Allied port for examination, is justified by the recognized principles of international law, and involved no greater hazard or prejudice to neutrals' trade than is commensurate with the gravity of the enemy outrages and the common need for their repression.

Appeal from decision of Evans, P. (62 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 504; 1918, P. 182), *affirmed.*

Appeal from a judgment of the late President of the Admiralty Division in Prize, allowing an action for condemnation of the steamship *Leonora* and her cargo under the Reprisals Order of 16th February, 1917, commonly known as the Second Retaliatory Order. The main issue was the validity of that Order. The appeal was argued before Lords Sumner, Parmoor, Wrenbury, Sterndale, and Sir Arthur Channell, and judgment reserved.

Lord SUMNER, who delivered the opinion of the Board, said that *The Leonora* was a Dutch steamship bound from Rotterdam to Stockholm direct. She was stopped on 16th August, 1917, by His Majesty's torpedo-boat F.77 outside territorial waters, shortly after passing Ymuiden, and taken into Harwich. Her cargo of coal, which was neutral owned, was the produce of collieries in Belgium. It was not intended that she should call at any British or Allied port, nor had any application been made on her behalf for the appointment of a British port for the examination of her cargo. Both ship and cargo were condemned, pursuant to the Order of Council dated 16th February, 1917, and both the shipowners and the cargo owners appealed. Their lordships were satisfied that the cargo was "of enemy origin" within the meanings of paragraphs 2 and 3 of that Order. The term had been used in the earlier Order of 11th March, 1915, paragraph 4, and owing to doubts about the effect of the word "enemy" therein, a further Order was made on 10th January, 1917, which applied the term "enemy origin" as used in that paragraph to goods "originating in any enemy country." In the present case the question was one of the interpretation of the third Order (16th February, 1917), which, beyond saying that it was supplemental to the Orders mentioned above, made no further express reference to them, but from the recital as to the recent proceedings of the German Government it was plain that the Order of 1917 dealt with a wider mischief, and was intended to have a wider scope than the previous Order. His lordship referred to the system of exploitation then in force in Belgium for the advancement of German interests, in order to throw light upon the full meaning of the words "enemy origin." The collieries from which this coal came were included in the German Kohlenzentrale, a system by which the coal production of Belgium was strictly controlled and was compulsorily manipulated with the object of supporting German exchange and assisting German commercial transactions with neutral countries, especially Holland and Sweden. In particular, the export of coal from Belgium to Sweden was encouraged. Coal thus won, sold and shipped as part of the German Government trade came within the term "of enemy origin," and to deny that it did would be pedantic. The Order was devised to give effect to a scheme of retaliation which would compel the enemy to desist in trading in goods which in a broad but very real sense he made his own. The expression "of enemy origin" was not merely a geographical term or descriptive of the nationality of the original owner of the goods. The appellants challenged the validity of the Order mainly on the ground that it pressed so hardly on neutral merchants, and interfered with their rights that it could not be held to fall within such rights of reprisal as a belligerent enjoyed under the Law of Nations. It was also argued that in its application to *The Leonora* the Order was bad, because no British port had been appointed at which she would call for the examination of her cargo. On that part of the argument their lordships were against the appellants, for the language of the Order in Council did not constitute the appointment of some British port for the examination of cargoes either of this ship or of ships in general a condition precedent to the application of the Order. In the case of *The Stigstad* (1919, A. C. 279), it was held that the Order in Council did not entail unreasonable inconvenience on neutrals, and was valid, and that the neutral shipowner was not entitled to damages for the detention of the ship or to expenses. Their lordships, in the present case, had to decide some, at least, of the principles on which, it was held in *The Stigstad case*, the exercise of the right of retaliation rested, and they saw no reason to doubt, after further research, the correctness of their opinion on that case. The onslaught on shipping generally which the German Government had carried out at the beginning of 1917 was now a matter of history. It afforded proof of the necessity of further invoking the right of retaliation. The right of retaliation was a right of the belligerent, not a concession by the neutral. It was enjoyed by law, and not on sufferance: and doubly so when, as in the present case, the outrageous conduct of the enemy might have been treated as acts of war by all mankind. Accordingly the most material question in this case was the degree of risk to which the deviation required would subject a neutral vessel which sought to comply with the Order. It was said, and with truth, that the German plan was, by mine and by submarine, to deny the North Sea to trade; that the danger, prospective and actual, which that plan involved must be deemed to have been real and great, or else the justification of the Order itself would fail. Proof of the amount of danger involved in crossing the minefield in itself was singularly lacking, but the fact was plain that after a voyage of no extraordinary character *The Leonora* did reach Harwich in safety. In these circumstances their lordships saw no reason for differing on a question of fact from the considered conclusion of the President. He was satisfied that the Order in Council did not involve greater hazard or prejudice to the neutral trade than was commensurate with the gravity of the enemy outrages and the common need for their repression. The appeal in this case failed, and would be dismissed with costs.—COUNSEL, for the appellant shipowners, *Sir John Simon*, K.C., *Sir Erle Richards*, K.C., *Mackinnon, K.C.*, and *Bisschop*; for the cargo-owners, *Leslie Scott*, K.C., *Bullock*, *Stuart Bevan*, and *Le Quesne*; for the Crown, the *Attorney-General*, the *Solicitor-General*, *Greer*, K.C., *Clive Lawrence*, and *Pearce Higgins*. SOLICITORS, *Guedalla & Jacobson*; *Botterell & Roche*; *Treasury Solicitor*.

[Reported by ERSKINE REID, Barrister-at-Law.]

High Court—Chancery Division.

Re **NATERS. AINGER** *v.* **NATERS.** Eve, J. 31st July.

ADMINISTRATION ORDER—DEBT ON WHICH IT CAN BE FOUNDED—ORDER OF CONSISTORY COURT TO PAY COSTS—DEATH OF DEBTOR—LIABILITY OF HIS ESTATE.

An order of a Consistory Court to pay costs, followed by a monition to pay the amount, creates a debt upon which a creditor's suit for administration can be founded after the debtor's death.

By a decree of the Consistory Court of Chelmsford, dated 16th November, 1894, made on the petition of the testator, then rector of St. James, Colchester, and the Churchwardens of the parish, it was amongst other things decreed that the petitioners should pay the costs of the opponents. The costs were duly taxed at £120 17s., and on 3rd February, 1916, a monition issued from the said Court to the petitioners to pay to the opponents that sum together with £9 18s. 8d., the expenses thereof, "under pain of the law of contempt thereof." The monition was duly served, but no part of the said sum was ever paid, nor were any steps taken to enforce payment, and on 4th October, 1917, the testator died. The defendant was the administrator with the will annexed, and the present summons asked for an order for the administration of the testator's real and personal estate, and the question raised was whether the plaintiff's claim to the costs was a debt on which an administration order could be founded.

EVE, J.: It is common ground that disobedience to the monition on the part of the testator rendered him contumacious, and that the only way in which such contumacy could be dealt with in his lifetime, assuming him not to be a person privileged from arrest, was by a writ *de contumacio capiendo*, under which he might be imprisoned till submission and obedience. Further, it is not disputed that, on the hearing of any application for the writ, it would have been open to the testator to show cause why it should not issue, and to produce evidence of want of means and other circumstances explanatory of his disobedience. But the death of the testator determined all opportunity of resorting to this remedy, and it is now argued on behalf of his estate that no remedy is now available, and that the amount cannot be recovered. I cannot adopt that view. The amount is a debt due in pursuance of an order of a competent court and is still unpaid. During the lifetime of the debtor it could only be enforced in the manner I have indicated, but now that his death has put an end to that method of enforcing payment, I cannot see any principle on which it should not be recoverable from his estate. I think the case is really governed by the decision of Sargant, J., in *Re Stilwell* (1916, 1 Ch. 365), and I hold that the claim of the plaintiff can be enforced against the testator's estate. If the defendant admits assets I will give judgment for the amount, with costs; if he does not admit assets I will now make the usual order for administration in a creditor's suit.—COUNSEL, *Errington; R. Turnbull.* SOLICITORS, *Bridges, Sawtell & Co.; Brooks, Jenkins & Co.*

[Reported by S. E. WILLIAMS, Barrister-at-Law.]

Re **BEECH. SAINT** *v.* **BEECH.** Eve, J. 30th July.

WILL—TRUST FOR CONVERSION—POWER TO POSTPONE—UNAUTHORIZED INVESTMENT—TENANT FOR LIFE AND REMAINDERMEN—RATE OF INTEREST.

The rate of interest allowed in calculations between tenant for life and remaindermen is now 4 per cent.

Re Owen (1912, 1 *Ch.* 519) *followed.*

By his will the testator devised and bequeathed his residuary real and personal estate to trustees upon trust for conversion with full power and discretion to postpone and to pay the income of the proceeds to certain persons successively for life, with remainder to their issue then living, and the trustees were empowered to determine whether any moneys were to be considered as capital or income. The greater part of the testator's estate consisted of his interest in a firm of woollen merchants in which he was a partner, and at his death a share of the profits was due and owing to him under the articles of partnership by the terms of which his interest in the firm became payable on his death to the trustees of his estate by instalments of £1,000 a year with interest at 5 per cent. The total amount payable under the provisions of the articles was £21,128 14s., and payments had been regularly made since the year 1911. The defendant, J. H. Beech, was now entitled for life to the income of all the residuary property that was left, namely, £8,267, of which £6,500 was still owing from the firm. One of the remaindermen was an infant. The plaintiff, as trustee of the testator's estate, was willing to pay to the tenant for life the whole of the 5 per cent. payable by the firm, but he desired the direction of the Court as to his power to do so, and the question raised by this summons was whether, in applying the principle of *Brown* v. *Gellatly* (L. R., 2 Ch. 751) interest at 3 or 4 per cent. ought to be allowed to the tenant for life.

EVE, J., said that for many years the rate of interest allowed to a tenant for life under these circumstances was 4 per cent., as laid down in *Meyer* v. *Simonson* (5 De G. & Sm. 723), *Wentworth* v. *Wentworth* (1900, A. C. 163), and *Re Owen* (1912, 1 Ch. 519), but there were to be found certain exceptions to the rule, of which *Re Woods* (1904, 2 Ch. 4) and *Re Chaytor* (1905, 1 Ch. 233) were examples. His lordship regretted that there had been a departure from the old salutary rule as to 4 per cent., and after considering the cases he came to the conclusion that, having regard to the first-class investments now available for trust property yielding up to 5 per cent., a good deal of the reasoning upon which *Re Woods* and *Re Chaytor* had been based was no longer effective. He therefore declared that the tenant for life was entitled to 4 per cent. per annum out of the income actually produced from the unauthorized investment as from the date of the testator's death.—COUNSEL, *Guest Mathews; Samuel Green; C. Nicoll.* SOLICITORS, *H. B. Wedlake; Saint & Co.*

[Reported by S. E. WILLIAMS, Barrister-at-Law.]

High Court—King's Bench Division.

SCOTT *v.* **NORTHUMBERLAND AND DURHAM MINERS' PERMANENT RELIEF FUND FRIENDLY AND APPROVED SOCIETY.** Div. Court. 25th July.

NATIONAL INSURANCE—APPROVED SOCIETY—WIFE OF INSURED PERSON—MATERNITY BENEFIT—NON-COHABITATION—ADULTERY OF WIFE—BIRTH OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILD—PAYMENT TO WIFE—NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT, 1911 (1 & 2 GEO. 5, c. 55), s. 8, SUB-SECTION (1) (E)—NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT, 1913 (3 & 4 GEO. 5, c. 37), s. 14, SUB-SECTION (1).

A woman, whose husband is an insured person in an approved society under the National Insurance Acts, 1911 *and* 1913, *is entitled to the payment to herself by the approved society of the maternity benefit provided by those Acts, though she has committed adultery, and given birth to an illegitimate child, and cohabitation has not been resumed by the husband and wife.*

Case stated by Insurance Commissioners under section 19 of the Arbitration Act, 1889. The above society was an approved society under Part I. of the National Insurance Act, 1911. David Scott was an insured person, and a member of the society. In September, 1915, he joined the Army, and went to France on military service. From that date he had not cohabited with his wife, who was confined on 15th January, 1917, of a child, of which it was admitted Scott was not the father. Mrs. Scott, after her confinement, claimed maternity benefit, but the General Committee of the society declined to pay, on the ground that the child of which she was confined was not the child of David Scott. The latter made no claim, and was not in any way a party to the application or proceedings. Mrs. Scott appealed to the Appeal Committee of the society, who decided against her, and Mrs. Scott then appealed to the Insurance Commissioners under section 67 of the Act of 1911 as a person claiming through a member of the society. The Commissioners stated that they had already held in a case similar to the present, and were prepared to hold in this case also (subject to the opinion of the Court), that (1) where the wife of an insured person was confined, maternity benefit was payable by the approved society of which her husband was a member, irrespective of questions as to the paternity of the child; (2) that the appellant was a person claiming through an insured person within the meaning of section 67, and rule 2d of the society's rules. The society defended their refusal to pay to the appellant the maternity benefit on the grounds:—(1) That maternity benefit, as defined by section 8, sub-section (1) (e) of the Act of 1911, was not payable in any case out of the husband's insurance in respect of any child other than a child by such husband; (2) that maternity benefit was not payable in respect of any child other than a child by such husband where the husband and wife were not living together; (3) that the claim was contrary to public policy; (4) that the appellant was not a party to any dispute with the society which had entitled her to appeal to the Commissioners. On this last point the Commissioners considered, and stated, that the society were precluded or estopped from raising any such question, seeing that the appellant's claim had already been entertained and determined by the General Committee and the Appeal Committee of the society without any objection to their jurisdiction being raised. The society appealed from the decision of the Commissioners, who stated a case for the opinion of the Court. Section 8, sub-section (1) (e), defines "maternity benefit" as "payment in the case of the confinement of the wife, or where the child is a posthumous child, of the widow of an insured person, or of any other woman who is an insured person, of a sum of thirty shillings." By section 18, sub-section (1), of the Act of 1911, as amended by section 14, sub-section (1), of the National Insurance Act, 1913, "The benefit shall be administered in the interests of the mother and child in cash or otherwise by the approved society of which the husband is a member." Section 14, sub-section (1), of the Act of 1913 provides that "maternity benefit shall in every case be the mother's benefit, but, where the benefit is payable in respect of the husband's insurance, the wife's receipt, or his receipt, if authorized by her, on her behalf, shall be a sufficient discharge to the society or committee, and, where the benefit is paid to the husband, he shall pay it to the wife."

THE COURT (DARLING, J., dissenting) were of opinion that the answers to the questions put to the Court in the case stated should be answered in favour of the wife, and that the appeal should be dismissed.

BRAY, J., was of opinion that there was no ambiguity in the meaning of section 8, sub-section (1) (e), of the Act of 1911, and applying the general rule of construction, that the grammatical meaning of the words should be given effect to, they covered such a case as the present. There was nothing in the other parts of the Act contradictory or inconsistent with this. It might in certain cases be of benefit to the husband to go back to his wife, although she had been unfaithful. In other cases, it might be of the greatest hardship to apply the rule

contended for by the society, for example, if the wife were raped and a child were born. He was of opinion that the appeal should be dismissed.

DARLING, J.—It could not be intended that the husband's money should be used to provide benefits for his adulterous wife and a bastard child. The benefit was for the insured person, and the husband was the insured person. What benefit went to the man from the payment of 30s. a week in this case? It went not to him, but to a guilty woman, whom he could not be compelled to keep if she became chargeable to the parish. There seemed nothing in section 8 (1) (c) which obliged the Court to hold that the appeal should be dismissed, and he thought it should be allowed.

Earl READING, L.C.J., said that the judgment of Bray, J., commended itself to him, though not entirely for the same reasons, and he agreed with much that Darling, J., had said. This was not a case of voluntary insurance; the workman was obliged to pay a portion of the premium, the State supplemented it, and the employers paid the balance. The statute was passed to promote better health, and to provide better treatment in sickness for those who came within it. The maternity benefit of the Acts of 1911 and 1913 was meant to enure for the benefit of the woman and the child, and not for the husband directly, though indirectly, through the good of his wife and child. The words of section 8, sub-section (1) (c) were wide, and he thought primarily were intended to mean a child of the marriage; but it was idle to speculate whether such a form of words was intended to restrict the benefit to a wife who gave birth to a child lawfully begotten. The words were wide enough to cover the confinement of the wife of an insured person without limitation. He agreed with Bray, J., that the ordinary rule of construction could be applied to this case without absurdity or inconsistency, looking to the objects and aim of the Acts. It was dangerous for a court to speculate on the mind of the Legislature apart from the language used. Whatever reasons might be given for a construction contrary to that which he had adopted, he saw equally well that to interpret the section otherwise might also lead to great hardship. Appeal dismissed.—COUNSEL, *A. S. Comyns Carr*, for the Society; *The Attorney-General (Sir Gordon Hewart, K.C.), G. A. H. Branson*, and *M. L. Gwyer*, for the Insurance Commissioners. SOLICITORS, *Kingsley Wood & Co.*, for *R. Sheriton Holmes*, Newcastle-on Tyne; *Solicitor to the Insurance Commissioners*.

[Reported by G. H. KNOTT, Barrister-at-Law.]

New Orders, &c.

Board of Trade Order.

[The following is substituted for the notice published in the *London Gazette* of Tuesday, September 2, 1919, p. 11001.]

DEFENCE OF THE REALM.

REGULATION 30BB.

TRANSFER OF SHARES IN CERTAIN UNDERTAKINGS.
BOARD OF TRADE GENERAL LICENCE.

The Board of Trade hereby authorize all transactions hitherto prohibited by Regulation 30BB of the Defence of the Realm Regulations, excepting such transactions as relate to any property or undertaking to which the regulation applies which is situated in the United Kingdom, or to any share, stock, debenture or other security issued by any company owning such undertaking or property or by a company having directly or indirectly by means of the holding of shares in any other company or otherwise the control of such undertaking or property which is so situated.

Whereas it is provided by Rule 28 of the Register of Patent Agents Rules, 1919, that the fees set forth in Appendix B to those Rules shall be paid in respect of the several matters and at the times and in the manner therein mentioned, and further that the Board of Trade may from time to time alter any of or add to the fees payable under those Rules; and whereas by Appendix B the annual fee to be paid to the Registrar of the Chartered Institute of Patent Agents by every registered patent agent is fixed at two pounds two shillings;

And whereas the said Chartered Institute of Patent Agents have represented to the Board of Trade that it is desirable to increase the said annual fee from two pounds two shillings to three pounds three shillings;

Now, therefore, the Board of Trade, by virtue and in exercise of the powers conferred upon them by the Register of Patent Agents Rules, 1919, do hereby order that the annual fee to be paid by every registered patent agent to the Registrar of the said Chartered Institute of Patent Agents on or before November 30 of the present year in respect of the year commencing January 1st, 1920, be fixed at the sum of three pounds three shillings.

Signed by order of the Board of Trade this 30th day of August, 1919.

[*Gazette*, 5th September.

Ministry of Munitions Orders.

CONTROLLED ESTABLISHMENTS.

THE MUNITIONS (ORDERING OF WORK IN ADMIRALTY ESTABLISHMENTS) REGULATIONS, 1919, DATED THE FOURTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1919, MADE BY THE ADMIRALTY IN PURSUANCE OF SECTION 4 (5) OF THE MUNITIONS OF WAR ACT, 1915 (5 & 6 GEO. 5, C. 54), AND OF SECTION 20 OF THE MUNITIONS OF WAR (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1916 (5 & 6 GEO. 5, C. 99).

Whereas in pursuance of section 20 of the Munitions of War (Amendment) Act, 1916, the Minister of Munitions has made an arrangement with the Admiralty for the exercise by the Admiralty of the power conferred on the Minister by section 4, sub-section (5), of the Munitions of War Act, 1915, of making regulations with respect to the general ordering of work in any shipbuilding or ship-repairing yard or marine engineering or other Admiralty Establishment being a Controlled Establishment.

Now therefore the Admiralty, in pursuance of the powers conferred upon them by section 4, sub-section (5), of the Munitions of War Act, 1915, and the said arrangement and of all other powers them thereunto enabling make the following Regulations:—

1. The Munitions (Ordering of Work in Admiralty Establishments) Regulations, 1918, as amended by Order dated October 2nd, 1918, made by the Admiralty pursuant to the said sections of the Munitions of War Acts, 1915 to 1917, are hereby revoked.

This Regulation may be cited as the Munitions (Ordering of Work in Admiralty Establishments) Regulation, 1919, and shall come into force on the fifth day of September, 1919.

[*Gazette*, 5th September.

THE MUNITIONS (ORDERING OF WORK) REGULATION, 1919, DATED THE FOURTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1919, MADE BY THE MINISTER OF MUNITIONS, IN PURSUANCE OF SECTION 4 (5) OF THE MUNITIONS OF WAR ACT, 1915 (5 & 6 GEO. 5, C. 54).

Whereas the Minister of Munitions, in pursuance of Section 4 (5) of the Munitions of War Act, 1915, made the Munitions (Ordering of Work) Regulations, 1916, and the Munitions (Ordering of Work) Amendment Regulation of 1916, and an Order of the 3rd day of July, 1917, made in pursuance of the last-named Regulation. And whereas the said Minister, in pursuance of Section 20 of the Munitions of War (Amendment) Act, 1916, made an arrangement with the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty for the exercise by them (*inter alia*) of the following powers of the said Minister—namely, in respect of shipbuilding and ship-repairing yards and marine engineering establishments, the powers conferred on the Minister by Section 4 (5) of the Munitions of War Act, 1915. And whereas the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, in pursuance of the powers conferred upon them by the said Section 4 (5) and the said arrangement, made on the 29th day of July, 1918, the Munitions (Ordering of Work in Admiralty Establishments) Regulations, 1918. Now the said Minister of Munitions hereby, in pursuance of Section 4 (5) of the Munitions of War Act, 1915, and of all other powers him thereunto enabling, hereby makes the following Regulation:—

1. The Munitions (Ordering of Work) Regulations, 1916, and the Munitions (Ordering of Work) Amendment Regulation, 1916, and the said Order of the 3rd day of July, 1917, are hereby revoked.

2. Nothing in this regulation contained shall affect the Munitions (Ordering of Work in Admiralty Establishments) Regulations, 1918.

3. This Regulation may be cited as the Munitions (Ordering of Work) Regulation, 1919, and shall come into force on the fifth day of September, 1919.

[*Gazette*, 6th September.

Ministry of Labour Order.

TRADE BOARDS ACTS, 1909 AND 1918.

NOTICE OF INTENTION TO MAKE A SPECIAL ORDER, TO BE CITED AS THE TRADE BOARDS (TOY) ORDER, 1919.

The Minister of Labour hereby gives notice, that he intends, pursuant to the powers conferred upon him by Section 1 of the Trade Boards Act, 1918, to make a Special Order applying the Trade Boards Acts, 1909 and 1918, to the Trade specified in the Appendix to this notice.

Copies of the draft Special Order may be obtained on application in writing to the Secretary, Ministry of Labour, Montagu House, Whitehall, London, S.W. 1.

Objections to the draft Special Order must be sent to the Minister of Labour, at the above address, within forty-two days from the 2nd day of September, 1919.

Every objection must be in writing, and must state :—

(*a*) the specific grounds of objection ; and

(*b*) the omissions, additions, or modifications asked for.

2nd September. [*Gazette*, 5th September.

APPENDIX.

TRADE.

The Toy Trade, that is to say, the manufacture of articles intended for the amusement of children, including dolls, soft toys, rag books, requisites for table games, bricks, blocks, puzzles, balls, Christmas crackers, Easter eggs, masks or drums ; *including also*

(*a*) The assembling of parts of any of the above-mentioned articles ;

(*b*) The operations of storing, boxing, packeting, labelling, or despatching, and all other warehousing or packing operations incidental to the manufacture of any of the above-mentioned articles ;

but excluding

(*a*) The manufacture of toys when carried on as a subsidiary branch of work in association with or in conjunction with the manufacture of other articles, so as to form a common or interchangeable form of employment for the workers ;

(*b*) The manufacture of sports requisites ;

(*c*) The manufacture of toy perambulators, toy wheel-barrows, toy scooters, nursery yachts, toy cycles, toy cars, toy horses, dolls' houses or other similar toys when carried on as a subsidiary branch of work in association with or in conjunction with the manufacture of perambulators, invalid carriages or folding push-cars, so as to form a common or interchangeable form of employment for the workers ;

(*d*) The manufacture from ceramic materials of dolls or dolls' parts, dolls' china, marbles or similar articles when carried on in association with or in conjunction with the manufacture of other pottery ;

(*e*) The making of articles from sugar confectionery ;

(*f*) The making of hollow-ware, including boxes and canisters, from sheet iron, sheet steel or tinplate, or any operations incidental thereto.

Home Office Order.

WELFARE OF WORKERS IN FACTORIES AND WORKSHOPS.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department hereby gives notice that he has amended the draft Order under Section 7 of the Police, Factories, &c. (Miscellaneous Provisions), Act, 1916, for securing the welfare of the workers employed in laundries, and that he proposes to make the Order in accordance with the amended draft, to apply to all factories and workshops or parts of factories and workshops which are laundries, except laundries in which no mechanical power is used and in which not more than five persons are employed.

Copies of the amended draft Order can be obtained on application to the Home Office, Whitehall, London, S.W. 1.

Any objection to the amended draft Order must be sent to the Secretary of State at the Home Office, Whitehall, London, S.W. 1, within 21 days after the date of this notice. The objection must be in writing, and must state :—

(*a*) The requirements in the amended draft Order objected to ;

(*b*) the specific grounds of objection ; and

(*c*) the modifications asked for.

Where an objection is made jointly on behalf of a number of occupiers, the names of the occupiers and their addresses must be stated, or, if the objection is made by an association of occupiers on behalf of its members, the number of the members affected by the Order.

2nd September. [*Gazette*, 5th September.

Ministry of Health Order.

THE HOUSING ACTS (COMPULSORY PURCHASE) REGULATIONS, 1919.

The Minister of Health, in pursuance of the powers conferred on him by the First Schedule to the Housing, Town Planning, &c., Act, 1909, and of all other powers enabling him in that behalf, hereby makes the following Regulations :—

ARTICLE I.—These Regulations may be cited as "The Housing Acts (Compulsory Purchase) Regulations, 1919."

ARTICLE II.—The Housing, &c. (Form of Compulsory Purchase Order, &c.) Order, 1911, made by the Local Government Board on the 14th day of June, 1911, is hereby revoked, except so far as it relates to any Compulsory Order made thereunder before the date of these Regulations.

ARTICLE III.—An Order made by a Local Authority under the First Schedule to the Housing, Town Planning, &c., Act, 1909 (hereinafter referred to as "the Compulsory Order"), shall be in the Form set forth in the Schedule hereto, or in a Form substantially to the like effect.

ARTICLE IV.—(1) Before submitting the Compulsory Order to the Minister of Health for confirmation, the Local Authority shall cause the same to be published by advertisement in two successive weeks in one or more of the local newspapers circulating in the District of the Local Authority and in the Parish or Parishes in which the land to which the Compulsory Order relates is situated.

(2) The advertisements shall be headed respectively "First Advertisement" and "Second and Last Advertisement," and the first of the said advertisements shall be published not later than the seventh day after the making of the Compulsory Order.

(3) Each of the said advertisements shall contain in addition to a copy of the Compulsory Order a notice setting out the following particulars :—

(*a*) a statement that any objection to the Compulsory Order must be presented to the Minister of Health within the period of fourteen days from and after the date of the publication of the first advertisement ; and

(*b*) a statement of the period, times, and place or places during and at which the deposited plan referred to in the Schedule to the Compulsory Order may be inspected by or on behalf of any person interested in the land to which the Compulsory Order relates.

(4) The plan referred to in the Schedule to the Compulsory Order shall be deposited by the Local Authority not later than the seventh day after the making of the Compulsory Order at a place convenient for the purposes of inspection, and shall be kept deposited thereat for a period not being less than fourteen days from the date of the publication of the first advertisement ; and the said plan shall be open for inspection by any person interested or affected, without payment of any fee, at all reasonable hours on any week-day during the said period. The Local Authority shall also make suitable provision for affording to any such person inspecting the said plan any necessary explanation or information in regard thereto.

ARTICLE V.—(1) The Local Authority shall, not later than the seventh day after the making of the Compulsory Order, cause notice thereof to be given to every owner, lessee, and occupier of the land to which the Compulsory Order relates, and every such notice shall include a copy of the Compulsory Order, to which shall be appended a notice containing the particulars mentioned in paragraph (3) of Article IV. of these Regulations.

(2) The Local Authority shall furnish a copy of the Compulsory Order, free of charge, to any person interested in the land to which the Compulsory Order relates, upon his applying for the same.

ARTICLE VI.—The period within which an objection to a Compulsory Order may be presented to the Minister of Health by a person interested in the land to which the Compulsory Order relates shall be the period of fourteen days from and after the date of the publication of the first advertisement of the Compulsory Order.

ARTICLE VII.—(1) The Local Authority shall as soon as practicable after the confirmation of the Compulsory Order cause a copy of the Compulsory Order as confirmed to be served on every owner, lessee, and occupier of the land to which the Compulsory Order relates.

(2) A copy of the Compulsory Order as confirmed shall be furnished free of charge by the Local Authority to any person interested in the land authorized to be purchased upon his applying for the same, and a copy of any plan to which reference is made in the Compulsory Order as confirmed shall also be furnished by the Local Authority to any such person upon his applying for such copy and paying the reasonable cost of preparing the same.

ARTICLE VIII.—Every notice or other document which in pursuance of paragraph (1) of Article V. or of paragraph (1) of Article VII. of these Regulations is required to be given, or served by the Local Authority to or on an owner, lessee, or occupier, shall be served:—

(*a*) by delivery of the same personally to the person required to be served, or, if such person is absent abroad or cannot be found, to his agent; or

(*b*) by leaving the same at the usual or last known place of abode of such person as aforesaid; or

(*c*) by post as a registered letter addressed to the usual or last known place of abode of such person; or

(*d*) in any case to which the three preceding paragraphs are inapplicable, by affixing the notice or other document upon some conspicuous part of the land to which the notice or document relates; or

(*e*) in the case of a notice required to be served on a local authority or corporate body or company, by delivering the same to their clerk or secretary or leaving the same at his office with some person employed there, or by post as a registered letter addressed to such clerk or secretary at his office.

ARTICLE IX.—Articles III. to VIII. of these Regulations shall not apply to any Compulsory Order made before the date hereof.

SCHEDULE.

THE HOUSING ACTS, 1890-1919.

ORDER FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LANDS.

The* hereby make the following Order:—

1. The provisions of the Lands Clauses Acts with respect to the purchase and taking of land otherwise than by agreement are, subject as hereinafter provided, hereby put in force as respects the purchase by the* of the lands described in the Schedule hereto for the†

2. The Lands Clauses Acts (except Section 127 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845), as modified, varied or amended by the First Schedule to the Housing, Town Planning, &c., Act, 1909, the Housing, Town Planning, &c., Act, 1919, and the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919, and Sections 77 to 85 of the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, are, subject to the necessary adaptations, incorporated with this Order, and the provisions of those Acts shall apply accordingly.

‡3. The sums agreed upon or awarded for the purchase of the lands described in the Schedule to this Order, being glebe land or other land belonging to an ecclesiastical benefice, or to be paid by way of compensation for the damage to be sustained by the owner by reason of severance or other injury affecting any such land, shall not be paid as directed by the Lands Clauses Acts, but shall be paid to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners to be applied by them as money paid to them upon a sale, under the provisions of the Ecclesiastical Leasing Acts, of land belonging to a benefice.

[3.] This Order shall come into operation as from the date of its confirmation by the Minister of Health.

THE SCHEDULE ABOVE REFERRED TO.

Numbers on Plan deposited at the Offices of the*	Quantity, Description and Situation of the Lands.	Owners or reputed Owners.	Lessees or reputed Lessees.	Occupiers.

Given under the Seal of the* this day of 19 .

* Here insert title of the Authority making the Order.

† Here insert "purposes of Part III. of the Housing of the Working Classes Act, 1890," or "purpose of [a town planning scheme] under the Town Planning Acts, 1909 and 1919," as the circumstances require. In the case of a town planning scheme, the name of the Authority who made the scheme and the date or short title of the scheme should be stated.

‡ Insert this Article where the lands described in the Schedule to the Order include glebe land or other land belonging to an ecclesiastical benefice.

29th August. [*Gazette*, 5th September.

Ministry of Food Orders.

THE IMPORTED BACON, HAM AND LARD (PRICES) ORDER, 1919.

In exercise of the powers conferred upon him by the Defence of the Realm Regulations and of all other powers enabling him in that behalf, the Food Controller hereby orders that, except under the authority of the Food Controller, the following Regulations shall be observed by all persons concerned:—

Sales not to be Above Maximum Price.

1. (*a*) A person shall not sell or offer or expose for sale or buy or offer to buy any imported bacon, ham, or lard at prices exceeding the maximum prices provided by or by notice under this Order.

Maximum Prices.

(*b*) Until further notice the maximuxm prices shall be as follows:—

(i) On the occasion of a sale of imported bacon, ham, or lard by an approved agent selling on account of the Food Controller to a nominated wholesaler, prices at the rate set out in Column "A" of the First Schedule;

(ii) On the occasion of a sale of imported bacon, ham, or lard by an approved agent selling on account of the Food Controller to a person other than a nominated wholesaler, prices at the rate set out in Column "B" of the First Schedule;

(iii) On the occasion of a sale of imported bacon, ham, or lard which is not a sale by retail and also is not a sale to which Subclause (i) or (ii) applies, prices at the rate set out in the Second Schedule;

(iv) On the occasion of a sale by retail, prices at the rate set out in the Third Schedule.

Delivery Included in Price in First and Second Schedules.

2. The maximum prices prescribed in the First and Second Schedules are fixed on the basis that the cost of delivery to the buyer's premises is included in the price, and no sales to which these Schedules apply shall be made on any other basis.

Terms of Payment under First and Second Schedules.

3. (*a*) On the occasion of a sale to which the First or Second Schedule applies the terms of sale shall be, at the seller's option, either:—

(i) Payment before delivery, with discount at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum for two months.

(ii) Payment within 7 days of the date of invoice, with discount at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum for two months.

(iii) Payment after 7 days of date of invoice, with discount at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum for the unexpired portion of 2 months and 3 days from date of invoice.

(*b*) For the purposes of this clause "date of invoice" shall mean the date of despatch of the goods to the buyer, or the date borne by the invoice, whichever shall be the later, excepting in cases where goods are detained pending buyer's instructions, in which case it shall mean the date when the goods were ready for despatch to the buyer.

Permitted Charge for Wrappers on Certain Sales.

4. Where on the occasion of a sale other than—

(*a*) a sale in original packages as imported, or

(*b*) a sale by retail,

the seller provides wrappers or other packing materials, the cost of the same may be charged to the buyer in addition to the prices prescribed under this Order; provided that such cost shall be shown separately on the invoice and shall be refunded in full to the buyer on his returning the wrappers or packing materials to the seller in good condition, fair wear and tear excepted.

Terms on Retail Sales.

5. On the occasion of a sale to which the Third Schedule of the Order applies:—

(*a*) The cost of suitable wrappings or packages is included in the price.

(*b*) Where delivery is made at the request of the buyer otherwise than at the seller's premises, an additional charge may be made in respect of such delivery not exceeding ½d. per lb., or any larger sum actually and properly paid by the seller for carriage.

(*c*) No charge may be made for packing, for packages, or for giving credit.

Bacon, Ham, and Lard to be invoiced as Imported or Home-Produced.

6. The invoice relating to any sale of bacon, ham, or lard, other than a sale by retail, shall state whether the bacon, ham, or lard is imported or home-produced.

Retailers to Display Prices.

7. Every person who sells imported bacon, ham, or lard by retail shall, so long as he has any imported bacon, ham, or lard for sale, display prominently at the place of sale a copy of the Schedule of maximum retail prices for the time being applicable under this Order, or until further notice a copy of the official Form M. 21 (2nd Revise) Great Britain.

Prohibited Cuts and Processes.

8. A person shall not, except on the occasion of a sale by retail, sell or buy any imported bacon or ham in a cut not specified in the First or Second Schedule, or on or after the 11th August, 1919, prepare for the purpose of sale any cut of imported bacon or ham by any process not specified against that cut in the Second Schedule, or sell or buy, except on the occasion of a sale by retail, any imported bacon or ham so prepared.

Fictitious Transactions.

9. A person shall not, in connection with any sale or disposition or proposed sale or disposition of any bacon, ham or lard, enter or offer to enter into any artificial or fictitious transaction or make or demand any unreasonable charge.

Exceptions.

10. Nothing in this Order shall apply to sales of bacon, ham or lard by a caterer for consumption as part of any meal provided by him in the ordinary course of his business as a caterer.

Interpretation.

11. The expression "approved agent" shall mean an agent approved by the Food Controller under this Order.

The expression "nominated wholesaler" shall mean a wholesale dealer for the time being nominated by the Food Controller under this Order.

The expression "bacon" shall include shoulders and picnics, but shall not include pickled pork or cured pigs' heads.

The expression "lard" shall not include neutral lard or compound.

The expression "pale dried" bacon or ham shall mean

(*a*) stove dried or

(*b*) dried by free exposure to dry air for at least five days.

Penalties.

12. Infringements of this Order are summary offences against the Defence of the Realm Regulations.

Commencement.

13. This Order shall come into force on the 11th August, 1919, except that on the occasion of a sale by wholesale (not being a sale by an approved agent selling on account of the Food Controller) of any imported bacon, ham or lard which has not been imported on account of the Food Controller and has not been requisitioned by or under the authority of the Food Controller, this Order shall not apply until 1st September, 1919.

Title and Extent.

14. (*a*) This Order may be cited as the Imported Bacon, Ham and Lard (Prices) Order, 1919.

(*b*) This Order shall not apply to Ireland.

6th August.

[Here follows three Schedules of Prices, too long to print.]

THE IMPORTED CHEESE (RETURNS) ORDER, 1919

In exercise of the powers conferred upon him by the Defence of the Realm Regulations and of all other powers enabling him in that behalf, the Food Controller hereby orders as follows:—

1. All persons owning or having power to dispose of any Imported Cheese purchased by them or shipped to them on consignment on or after the 1st August, 1919, shall, as soon as possible, and in any case before the arrival of such Cheese in the United Kingdom, furnish to the Secretary, Ministry of Food (Cheese Section), New County Hall, Westminster Bridge-road, S.E. 1, a return shewing:—

(*a*) the amounts and varieties of such Imported Cheese shipped to the United Kingdom to them or to their order and

(*b*) the amount thereof purchased and the amount shipped on consignment,

and shall furnish copies of the original invoices and such other documents and particulars as may from time to time be required by or under the authority of the Food Controller.

2. For the purposes of this Order the expression "Imported Cheese" means any Cheese manufactured outside the United Kingdom except fancy or grating varieties.

3. Infringements of this Order are summary offences against the Defence of the Realm Regulations.

4. This Order may be cited as the Imported Cheese (Returns) Order, 1919.

8th August.

THE IMPORTED CHEESE (IMPORTER'S PRICE) ORDER, 1919.

In exercise of the powers conferred upon him by the Defence of the Realm Regulations and of all other powers enabling him in that behalf, the Food Controller hereby orders:—

1. A person shall not sell or offer or attempt to sell, or buy or offer or attempt to buy, any Imported Cheese at a price exceeding the maximum price prescribed by or under this Order, or in connection with any sale or disposition of Imported Cheese enter or offer to enter into any artificial or fictitious transaction or make or propose any unreasonable charge.

2. (*a*) Upon a sale of Imported Cheese by or on behalf of the Importer thereof, the maximum price shall, until further notice and except as hereinafter provided, be at the rate of 1s. 2d. per lb.

(*b*) The maximum price for the time being in force under this clause is fixed on the basis that the cheese is sold to the purchaser ex quay or ex store and that no additional charge is made for packing or packages.

(*c*) The foregoing maximum price shall not until further notice apply to cheese purchased for shipment to the United Kingdom, or shipped on consignment to the United Kingdom, before 1st August, 1919.

3. For the purposes of this Order:—

(*a*) The expression "Imported Cheese" means any Cheese manufactured outside the United Kingdom, except Cheese of fancy and grating varieties.

(*b*) The expression "Importer" includes the person sighting the shipper's draft, but this shall not be construed as limiting the general interpretation of that expression.

4. Infringements of this Order are summary offences against the Defence of the Realm Regulations.

5. This Order may be cited as the Imported Cheese (Importer's Price) Order, 1919.

6. This Order shall come into operation on 8th August, 1919.

8th August.

THE BRITISH CHEESE ORDER, 1917.

Notice.

Pursuant to the powers reserved to him by the above Order [S. R. & O., No. 848 of 1919], the Food Controller hereby orders that the maximum first-hand prices prescribed by the Notice dated 10th July, 1919 [S. R. & O., No. 1105 of 1917, as amended by No. 396 of 1918], issued under the above Order shall, so far as they apply to cheese manufactured in Scotland between 11th August, 1919, and 31st August, 1919 inclusive, be increased by the sum of 4d. per lb.

12th August.

THE CANNED FISH (RETAIL PRICES AND DISTRIBUTION) ORDER, 1918, AS AMENDED BY AN ORDER DATED THE 20TH MAY, 1919.

General Licence.

On and after the 12th August, 1919, until further notice Norwegian Canned Brisling, Mousse or Sild may be bought or sold free from the restrictions imposed by the above Order.

12th August.

ORDER AMENDING THE POULTRY AND GAME (PRICES) ORDER, 1918.

In exercise of the powers conferred upon him by the Defence of the Realm Regulations and of all other powers enabling him in that behalf, the Food Controller hereby orders that the Poultry and Game (Prices) Order, 1918 (hereinafter called the Principal Order), shall be amended as follows :—

1. In the Schedule to the Principal Order as amended—

(*a*) the words "Grouse and Black Game, young birds (hatched in the year 1918 and sold prior to 1st November, 1918)" shall be deleted and the following words shall be substituted therefor :—

"Grouse and Black Game, young birds (hatched in the year 1919 and sold prior to 1st November, 1919)."

(*b*) the words "Partridges, young birds (hatched in the year 1918 and sold prior to the 1st January, 1919)," shall be deleted and the following words shall be substituted therefor :—

"Partridges, young birds (hatched in the year 1919 and sold prior to the 1st January, 1920)."

2. Copies of the Principal Order hereafter to be printed under the authority of His Majesty's Stationery Office shall be printed with the amendment provided for by this Order, and the Principal Order shall on and after 13th August, 1919, be read and take effect as hereby amended.

13th August.

Legal News.

Changes in Partnerships.

Dissolutions.

WILLIAM GEORGE ALBERT EDWARDS and HAROLD HOLT, solicitors (W. G. A. Edwards), 3, Coleman-street, London. August 28. All debts due to and owing by the said late firm will be received and paid respectively by W. G. A. Edwards, who will continue to carry on the practice. [*Gazette*, September 5.

ARTHUR SAVAGE COOPER and BERNARD RICHARD EVERETT, solicitors (Savage, Cooper, & Everett), 27, Chancery-lane, London. Sept. 1.

EDWARD HENRY PRESTON and ARTHUR CLOWES KNIGHT SMITH, solicitors (Preston & Smith), 34, Brazennose-street, Manchester. Sept. 1. All debts due to and owing by the said late firm will be received and paid by the said Edward Henry Preston.

WALTER BERNARD SMITH, EDGAR YOUATT, and SAMUEL ARTHUR SMITH, solicitors (Smith, Youatt & Smith), 2, Cooper-street, Manchester. Sept. 30. All debts due to and owing by the said late firm will be received and paid by the said Edgar Youatt and Samuel Arthur Smith. [*Gazette*, September 9.

General.

The Temple was the scene the other day of an unexpected and unwonted sensation. A building in Middle Temple-lane had a chimney on fire, and for a moment nervous residents feared for the wooden buildings all round. A fire-engine actually penetrated into the sacred premises. But the scare did not last long; the fire was soon put out, and the "practice in chambers" duly resumed.

Eighty-five miners were summoned at Port Talbot for non-payment of income-tax. In one case the man earned £116 in three months. Orders for payment were made.

Sir John Simon intended, on his return to England from a holiday in the Mediterranean, to test the legality of the Government edict prohibiting the import of certain articles in ordinary use. On his arrival with Lady Simon, from Gibraltar, he told a Press representative the object and result of his action. "I believed, and most lawyers held, that these trade prohibitions were illegal and without Parliamentary authority," he said, "and their effect was to interfere with trade. Therefore, I claimed to import some prohibited goods of foreign origin, such as furniture and boots, and I communicated my intention to the Board of Trade. While I have been away, however, the Government has announced that the system is abandoned as from 1st September, so my main object has been attained. As for so-called key industries, I should like to see what they are. There ought to be no difficulty in testing what remains of this method of embargoes if circumstances require it. I am convinced that the only way to restore more normal conditions to commerce and finance is to open the ports and deflate the currency."

At the Wallasey (Cheshire) Revision Court the registration officer decided that although a woman was supposed to have the same qualifications as a man, she was not, owing to a slip in the Act, entitled to the same rights in regard to successive occupation from a contiguous borough to either the Parliamentary or municipal vote. On this ground the names of forty-five women were struck off. It was stated there would probably be an appeal.

Captain the Hon. Laurence Edward Broomfield Palk, son of Baron Haldon, was court-martialled at Newark Barracks on a charge of cashing an £11 cheque at Newark, and a £1 cheque at the Officers' Club, London, both being dishonoured. Captain Palk said his father promised to credit his account at Cox's with certain sums, but failed to do so. He had served in Gallipoli and Mesopotamia. The court's finding will be promulgated.

The Marquis of Northampton has informed each of his tenants on his estate at Highbury and Canonbury, North London, that owing to the increase of rates levied by the borough council to meet the increased expenditure due to the war he is obliged to add to rent the proportionate amount of rates as provided for by the Increase of Rent and Mortgages Interest (War Restrictions) Acts, 1915 and 1919. The local rates have been increased from 3s. 11½d. in the pound for the half-year to September, 1915, to 5s. 6d. in the pound for the half-year beginning 30th September, 1919, making a total increase of 1s. 6½d. in the pound for the coming half-year.

Arthur William White, aged twenty-one, an able seaman, was acquitted at the North London Court of a charge of manslaughter. White and Henry William Williams, aged nineteen, an ex-Naval man, were friends, but they quarrelled about a girl, and Williams challenged White to fight. White was anxious to avoid a fight, but blows were struck in Miller's-avenue, where the window ledges overlap the pavement. Williams fell and struck his head on one of the ledges, with fatal consequences.